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Death, Deprivation, and a Sartrean Account of Horror
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-04-17 , DOI: 10.1111/papq.12353
Frederik Kaufman 1
Affiliation  

Deprivation offers a plausible explanation for the badness of death, so fear is not unreasonable. But horror at the prospect of one's death is not just extreme fear because horror is structurally different than fear. Horror requires a different explanation. For Sartre, horror is possible only in unique circumstances. I argue that Sartre's view, when combined with the subjective incomprehensibility of one's annihilation, can explain horror and other negative emotions that are not contingent on deprivation. Further, I argue that while fear can be reasonable if one's death will deprive, Lucretius's Symmetry Argument shows that horror is unreasonable.

中文翻译:

死亡、剥夺和萨特对恐怖的描述

剥夺为死亡的严重性提供了一个合理的解释,因此恐惧并非没有道理。但对死亡前景的恐惧不仅仅是极度恐惧,因为恐惧在结构上与恐惧不同。恐怖需要不同的解释。对萨特来说,恐怖只有在特殊情况下才有可能。我认为,当萨特的观点与对个人毁灭的主观不可理解性相结合时,可以解释恐怖和其他不依赖于剥夺的负面情绪。此外,我认为,如果一个人的死亡会剥夺一切,那么恐惧可能是合理的,但卢克莱修的对称论证表明,恐惧是不合理的。
更新日期:2021-04-17
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