The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory’s application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory’s predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field’s reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.

中文翻译：

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证伪与意识

对科学意识理论的探索应该产生可证伪的理论。然而，在这里我们表明，证伪对于意识理论来说尤其成问题。我们正式描述了测试这些理论的标准实验装置。基于理论对某些物理系统（例如大脑）的应用，测试需要将理论的预测体验（给定系统的一些内部可观察数据，如大脑成像数据）与推断的体验（使用报告或行为）进行比较。如果推论和预测之间存在不匹配，那么理论就会被证伪。我们证明，如果推理和预测是独立的，那么任何最小信息量的意识理论都会自动被证伪。这是一个很严重的问题，因为该领域依赖报告或行为来推断意识体验意味着这种独立性，因此这种脆弱性影响了许多当代的意识理论。此外，我们表明，如果推理和预测严格相关，则理论是不可证伪的。这影响了声称意识由报告或行为决定的理论。最后，我们探讨摆脱这一困境的可能方法。