We look at Chile’s transition to democracy in 1990 to study the persistence of authoritarian politics at the local level. Using new data on the universe of mayors appointed by the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990) and leveraging on the arbitrary election rules that characterized the first local election in 1992, we present two main findings. First, dictatorship mayors obtained a vote premium that is larger among the last wave of incumbents and appears partially explained by an increase in local spending. Second, dictatorship mayors who were democratically elected in 1992 brought votes for the parties that collaborated with the dictatorship in subsequent elections held in democracy. These results show that the body of politicians appointed by a dictatorship can contribute to the persistence of elites and institutions.

我们考察了1990年智利向民主的过渡，以研究地方政府的威权政治的持久性。利用皮诺切特专政（1973-1990年）任命的市长领域的新数据，并利用以1992年第一次地方选举为特征的任意选举规则，我们得出了两个主要发现。首先，独裁市长获得的选票溢价在最后一任现任官员中占较大比例，这在一定程度上可以解释为当地支出的增加。第二，在1992年民主选举的独裁市长为在随后的民主选举中与独裁合作的政党投票。这些结果表明，由独裁统治任命的政客团体可以促进精英和机构的持续存在。