Across a wide variety of semantically ambiguous sentences, implicature has been proposed as a single mechanism which can derive one reading from another in a systematic way. While a single formal mechanism for computing implicatures across disparate cases has an appealing parsimony, differences in behavioral and processing signatures between cases have created a debate about whether the same computation really is so widely shared. Building on previous work by Bott and Chemla (2016), three experiments use structural priming to test for shared computations across three purported cases of implicature: the quantifier some, number words, and Free Choice disjunctions. While we find evidence of a shared computation between the enriched readings of some and number words, we find no evidence that Free Choice readings involve any shared computation with either some or number. Along with evidence of a shared mechanism between some and number implicatures, we also find substantial differences between these two cases. We propose a way to reconcile these findings, as well as seemingly contradictory prior evidence, by understanding implicature as a sequence of separable sub-computations. This implies a spectrum of possibilities for which sub-computations might be shared or distinct between cases, instead of a single implicature mechanism that can only be either present or absent.

在各种语义上模棱两可的句子中，隐含性已被提出为一种单一的机制，可以以系统的方式从另一种阅读中获得一种阅读。虽然用于计算不同案件中的含意的单一正式机制具有吸引人的简约性，但案件之间行为和处理签名的差异引发了关于同一计算是否真的如此广泛共享的争论。在Bott和Chemla（2016）的先前工作的基础上，三个实验使用结构化启动来测试跨三个声称的隐含情况的量的共享计算：量词some，数字词和Free Choice析取词。虽然我们发现一些丰富阅读之间共享计算的证据和数量的话，我们没有发现证据表明自由选择阅读涉及与任何任何共享计算一些或号码。除了一些含义和数量含义之间存在共享机制的证据外，我们还发现这两种情况之间存在实质性差异。我们提出了一种通过将隐含理解为可分离的子计算序列来调和这些发现以及看似矛盾的先验证据的方法。这意味着在案例之间共享或区分子计算的可能性范围很大，而不是仅存在或不存在的单一含义机制。