In this paper, we conduct an experiment in order to explore how the legal fee arrangement (i.e. flat or contingent fees) and the trial costs allocation rule (i.e. American or English rule) may shape the efficiency of the litigation process, via their effect on the lawyer’s effort, the deterrence of frivolous lawsuits and the plaintiff’s incentives to go to court. In our experimental context, it is shown that the combination of contingent fees and English rule is the best setting in terms of effort incentives, but enhances frivolous lawsuits. This result may indicate potentially that the recent tendency observed in European countries to combine contingency and English rule would be desirable only if it is associated to mechanisms discouraging plaintiffs to sue meritless cases.

在本文中，我们进行了一项实验，以探讨法律费用安排（即固定费用或或有费用）和审判费用分配规则（即美国或英国规则）如何通过对诉讼费用的影响来影响诉讼程序的效率。律师的努力，轻率诉讼的威慑力以及原告提起诉讼的动机。在我们的实验环境中，事实表明，或有费用和英语规则相结合是努力激励方面的最佳设置，但是却增加了琐碎的诉讼。该结果可能潜在地表明，欧洲国家最近观察到的将权变和英国规则相结合的趋势，只有在与阻止原告提起无理诉讼的机制有关的情况下，才是可取的。