Turkey’s relations with Egypt abruptly hit rock bottom following the Egyptian army’s ousting of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013. Despite significant political fluctuations between the two countries, there is a gap in academic literature about addressing alterations in Turkish–Egyptian relations holistically. To this end, this article proposes that Turkey’s volatile relationship with the Egyptian governments since the so-called Arab Spring is partially a reflection of broader institutional changes in Turkey’s domestic settings. One of these salient changes is the discursive transformation of Turkish national self-perception. This article shows how Turkey’s new governmental self-understanding of “majoritarianism” manifests in its relations with Egypt. It asserts that this transformation in the governmental perception of the national-self made Turkey’s policies on Egypt, which oscillate between one extreme to another, “conceivable/thinkable” via the medium of national identity discourses. It shows the interplay between the governmental identity discourses of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) elites and Turkey’s policies on Egypt in the institutional/non-discursive foreign policy field.

在埃及军队于2013年7月罢免穆罕默德·莫尔西（Mohammed Morsi）之后，土耳其与埃及的关系突然跌至谷底。尽管两国之间存在重大政治动荡，但有关解决土耳其-埃及关系整体变化的学术文献仍存在差距。为此，本文提出，自所谓的“阿拉伯之春”以来，土耳其与埃及政府的动荡关系在一定程度上反映了土耳其国内环境发生的更广泛的制度变化。这些重大变化之一是土耳其国民自我观念的话语转变。本文说明了土耳其对“主权主义”的新政府自我理解如何体现在与埃及的关系中。它断言，政府对民族自我的看法的这种转变使土耳其对埃及的政策得以通过民族认同话语在一种极端与另一种“可想像/可想像的”之间摇摆。它显示了正义与发展党（AKP）精英的政府认同话语与土耳其在体制性/非干扰性外交政策领域中对埃及的政策之间的相互作用。