There is ample research on the incidence of coups d’état but less on their aftermath. Why do some national leaders who seize power via military coup stay in power longer than others once they unseat their predecessors? This study tests whether facial attractiveness—which we argue is a testable proxy for personal charisma—helps explain variation in coup-installed leader survival. We draw on multiple data sources of coups worldwide from 1950 to 2010, as well as original attractiveness data coded from survey responses. We find that more attractive coup-installed leaders retain power longer than their less attractive counterparts after successfully ousting the incumbent. The attractiveness advantage is particularly strong for leaders in the first 5 years of their tenure, those who seized power from a dictatorship as opposed to a democracy, and those who rule without parties in the legislature. We argue that leaders who take power through a military coup lack both traditional and rational-legal authority; for such cases, facial attractiveness may signal charismatic authority sufficient to survive the institutional vacuum following an unconstitutional ascent to power.

关于政变发生率的研究很多，但对政变的后果却很少。为什么一些通过军事政变掌权的国家领导人在失去前任后会比其他国家的执政时间更长？这项研究测试了脸部吸引力（我们认为这是个人魅力的可测指标）是否有助于解释因政变而上任的领导者生存率的差异。我们利用1950年至2010年全球政变的多种数据来源，以及根据调查答复编码的原始吸引力数据。我们发现，成功罢免现任总统后，政变更有吸引力的领导人比其吸引力较小的领导人保留权力的时间更长。对于在任职头五年的领导人来说，吸引力优势尤其明显，他们是从独裁政权而非民主手中夺取政权的人，以及那些在立法机关中没有政党统治的人。我们认为，通过军事政变掌权的领导人既缺乏传统权威，也缺乏理性法律权威。在这种情况下，面部吸引力可能标志着超凡魅力，足以在违宪提升权力后在体制真空中幸存下来。