ABSTRACT

In this article I examine the importance of self-respect in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice. First, I present two elements that are part of the contemporary debate on self-respect as a form of self-worth—namely, moral status and merit. Second, I specify the bases that support self-respect within A Theory of Justice. Finally, I discuss at length the function of self-respect in justifying the principles of justice. This inquiry implies an analysis of the relationship between self-respect and the component parts of the two principles of justice: basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle. I also explore the connection between self-respect and the sense of justice in light of the stability argument, and how the relationship between the two is important for achieving social stability.

摘要

在这篇文章中，我考察了自尊在为罗尔斯的正义理论辩护中的重要性。首先，我提出了两个要素，它们是当代关于自尊作为一种自我价值形式的辩论的一部分——即道德地位和优点。其次，我在《正义论》中详细说明了支持自尊的基础. 最后，我详细讨论了自尊在证明正义原则方面的作用。这项调查意味着分析自尊与正义的两个原则的组成部分之间的关​​系：基本自由、机会公平平等和差异原则。我还根据稳定论探讨了自尊与正义感之间的联系，以及两者之间的关系对实现社会稳定有何重要意义。