In ‘The Choice Theory of Contracts’, we advance a claim about the centrality of autonomy to contract. Since publishing Choice Theory, we have engaged dozens of reviews and responses; here, we reply to Robert Stevens, Arthur Ripstein, and Brian Bix. All this rigorous debate confirms for us one core point: contract’s ultimate value must be autonomy, properly understood and refined. Autonomy is the telos of contract and its grounding principle. In Choice Theory, we stressed the (1) proactive facilitation component of autonomy, in particular, the state’s obligation regarding contract types. Here, we highlight two additional, necessary implications of autonomy for contract: (2) regard for future selves and (3) relational justice. These three aspects of autonomy shape the range, limit, and floor, respectively, for the legitimate use of contract. They provide a principled and constrained path for law reform.

在“合同选择理论”中，我们提出了关于自治在合同中的核心地位的主张。自从发表《选择论》以来，我们已经进行了数十次评论和回应。在这里，我们回复罗伯特·史蒂文斯（Robert Stevens），亚瑟·里普斯坦（Arthur Ripstein）和布莱恩·比克斯（Brian Bix）。所有这些严格的辩论为我们确认了一个核心点：合同的最终价值必须是自主性，正确理解和完善的。自治是合同的宗旨和扎根的原则。在选择理论，我们强调了（1）自治的主动促进因素，尤其是国家对合同类型的义务。在这里，我们强调了合同自治的另外两个必要的含义：（2）尊重未来的自我；（3）关系公正。自治的这三个方面分别塑造了合同合法使用的范围，限制和下限。它们为法律改革提供了原则性和约束性的途径。