Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents (or, agent-involving events) cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or not: Maddy’s reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent’s lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent’s lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up.

This paper is divided into six parts. In Section One, I minimally define libertarian free will as accepting agential indeterminism, which is the conjunction of indeterminism and agential causation, where agential indeterminism occurs when an agent’s reasons, efforts or character indeterministically cause actions. In Sections Two and Three I outline the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian free will, which states that sub-agential physical processes in the brain indeterministically cause actions to occur, and agents lack control over these indeterministic physical causes, so agent’s lack control over whether their actions occur. If agent’s lack control over whether actions occur, the occurrence of these actions is lucky, where this luck jeopardizes free will and moral responsibility. In Sections Four through Six I consider three recent libertarian responses to this objection—Mark Balaguer in Section Four, Chris Franklin in Section Five, and Robert Kane in Section Six. I conclude that none of these models satisfactorily overcomes the physical indeterminism luck objection, though one interpretation of Kane yields a promising avenue of reply.

自由主义者的自由意志大致上是指代理人（或涉及代理人的事件）导致行动发生或不发生的观点：Maddy决定买啤酒的决定使她从舒适的沙发上站下来喝啤酒，尽管她几乎选择不起床。自由主义者的自由意志臭名昭著地面临着运气的反对，根据这种反对，代理国家不能确定一个行动是否发生，因此这超出了行动者的控制，因此很幸运，一个行动是否发生了：玛迪喝啤酒的原因。保持坐在舒适座椅上的理由并不能决定她会起床还是就座，因此，起床似乎超出了她的控制，因此很幸运。在本文中，我考虑了一个运气异议的子集，称为物理不确定性运气异议，根据哪个不确定的物理过程导致动作发生与否，以及代理对这些不确定的物理过程的缺乏控制，因此代理对这些不确定的物理过程的控制不足，因此幸运的是，是否发生了动作。在激发身体上不确定性的运气异议之后，我考虑了来自三个最近的因果自由主义者模型的回应，并得出结论，尽管开辟了一个有希望的途径，但他们未能克服问题。

本文分为六个部分。在第一节中，我最低限度地将自由主义者的自由意志定义为接受代理人的不确定性，这是不确定性和代理人因果关系的结合，当代理人的原因，努力或性格不确定地引起行动时，就会出现代理人不确定性。在第二部分和第三部分中，我概述了对自由主义者自由意志的身体不确定性运气的反对，它指出大脑中亚次要的物理过程不确定性地导致了动作的发生，并且行为主体对这些不确定性物理原因缺乏控制，因此行为主体无法控制是否他们的行为发生了。如果代理人无法控制行为是否发生，那么这些行为的发生就是幸运的，因为这种运气会损害自由意志和道德责任。在第四节至第六节中，我考虑了针对此反对意见的三个自由主义者最近的回应：第四节中的Mark Ba​​laguer，第五节中的Chris Franklin和第六节中的Robert Kane。我得出的结论是，尽管对凯恩（Kane）的一种解释产生了一种有希望的答复途径，但是这些模型都不能令人满意地克服物理上不确定性的运气异议。