This paper shows that social networks are likely to induce sector concentration and sector trapping in the labor market. We develop a two-sector economy with endogenous allocation of the labor force between sectors and social networks that favor the transmission of job information. We show that social networks can induce sector concentration even when sectoral productivities and entry costs are perfectly symmetric. Moreover, we show that social networks can also trap workers in poorly productive sectors. These results are in accordance with the migration history and the situation of Portuguese immigrants in the French labor market.

中文翻译：

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社交网络，失业和行业陷阱

本文表明，社会网络有可能在劳动力市场上引起部门集中和部门陷阱。我们发展了两部门经济，在部门和社会网络之间有利于传递工作信息的劳动力是内生的分配。我们表明，即使部门生产率和进入成本是完全对称的，社会网络也可以引起部门集中。此外，我们表明，社交网络也可能将工人困在生产效率低下的部门。这些结果与移民历史和法国劳动力市场上葡萄牙移民的状况相吻合。