Members of the non-proliferation regime give technical assistance to countries contemplating nuclear weapons. This is puzzling: it facilitates the behavior donors wish to stop, and other forms of concessions do not have this drawback. Why do it? I develop a model of uncertainty, bargaining, and nuclear proliferation. In it, assistance hastens acquisition time but also generates a signal about the recipient’s domestic nuclear proficiency. This allows donors to better calibrate other concessions to the recipient. In equilibrium, donors sometimes find the information worth sacrificing bargaining leverage for. However, despite providing information, assistance can cause proliferation if donors believe that the recipient is competent but observe a misleading signal indicating incompetence. This paper works toward understanding how scientific intelligence affects international negotiations, an underexplored subject matter for political scientists.

防扩散制度的成员向正在考虑核武器的国家提供技术援助。这令人费解：它有助于捐助者希望停止的行为，而其他形式的让步也没有这个缺点。为什么呢 我建立了不确定性，讨价还价和核扩散的模型。在这种援助中，援助不仅缩短了获取时间，而且还发出了有关受援国国内核能力的信号。这使捐助者可以更好地为接受者校准其他优惠。在平衡状态下，捐助者有时会发现值得牺牲讨价还价杠杆作用的信息。然而，尽管提供了信息，但如果捐助者认为受援者有能力但观察到表明其无能的误导性信号，援助仍可能引起扩散。