In this article, we analyse the role of regulatory intermediaries of the Better Cotton Initiative, a multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) in the global cotton value chain, with a regional focus on India and Pakistan. We conceptualize how the key roles of regulatory intermediaries — translating and verifying compliance with abstract rules in ways that make these rules practical and intelligible for target audiences (in this case, cotton farmers) — may be compromised by global value chain pressures and contradictory MSI requirements, thereby undermining the aim of mainstreaming sustainability standard systems. In other words, we theorize how MSIs can become subject to regulatory capture, serving the needs of global brands (for rapid upscaling, price minimization and verification) and sustainability standard bodies (contradictory demands for capacity building and compliance) at the expense of the intended beneficiaries — farmers at the base of global value chains. Based on an empirical analysis of the Better Cotton Initiative's implementing partners in Pakistan and India, we conclude that such weaknesses in standard implementation are likely to translate into poorer field-level results in terms of ensuring the large-scale, global mainstreaming of more sustainable commodity production sought by MSI practitioners.

中文翻译：

---

巴基斯坦和印度多利益相关方倡议中的全球价值链和中介

在本文中，我们分析了良好棉花倡议监管中介的作用，该倡议是全球棉花价值链中的多方利益相关者倡议 (MSI)，区域重点是印度和巴基斯坦。我们概念化监管中介的关键作用——以让这些规则对目标受众（在这种情况下，棉农）实用和易懂的方式翻译和验证对抽象规则的遵守——可能会受到全球价值链压力和相互矛盾的 MSI 要求的影响，从而破坏了将可持续性标准体系纳入主流的目标。换句话说，我们将 MSI 如何成为监管捕获的对象，满足全球品牌的需求（快速升级，价格最小化和验证）和可持续性标准机构（能力建设和合规性的相互矛盾的要求）以牺牲预期的受益者——全球价值链基础的农民为代价。根据对巴基斯坦和印度的“更好棉花倡议”执行伙伴的实证分析，我们得出结论，在确保更可持续的商品的大规模全球主流化方面，标准实施中的这些弱点可能会转化为较差的实地结果MSI 从业者寻求的生产。