We show that high cash holdings can be used by executives in the ex post bargaining over their compensation. Cash holdings are positively associated with CEO compensation and is driven by non-salary components. In companies with weaker governance, this relation is more pronounced. Using exogenous shocks to the firm’s cash, we show that CEO compensation readily responds to increases in cash holdings, confirming that managers are able to derive personal benefits from excess cash holdings.

中文翻译：

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事后谈判、公司现金持有和高管薪酬

我们表明，高管可以在事后就薪酬进行讨价还价时使用高额现金持有量。现金持有量与 CEO 薪酬呈正相关，并受非薪酬部分驱动。在治理较弱的公司中，这种关系更为明显。利用对公司现金的外生冲击，我们表明 CEO 的薪酬很容易对现金持有量的增加做出反应，这证实了管理者能够从过剩的现金持有量中获得个人利益。