Having a monopoly that is not owned domestically affects a country's income redistribution policies. Assume the government uses lump-sum taxes to redistribute but cannot regulate the monopolist's price. In many relevant circumstances, a social planner would not equate social marginal utilities of income across individuals. Thus, using aggregate welfare functions as the preferences of a single representative consumer is valid only under restrictive circumstances. The monopolist always prefers to set price before the social planner chooses transfers, while the social planner may not have a first-mover advantage. Under endogenous timing of their decisions, the government never moves before the monopolist.

中文翻译：

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最优国内再分配与跨国垄断

拥有非国内所有的垄断会影响一个国家的收入再分配政策。假设政府使用一次性税收来重新分配，但不能调节垄断者的价格。在许多相关情况下，社会规划者不会将个人收入的社会边际效用等同起来。因此，使用总福利函数作为单一代表性消费者的偏好仅在限制性情况下才有效。垄断者总是喜欢在社会计划者选择转移之前设定价格，而社会计划者可能没有先发优势。在他们决策的内生时机下，政府永远不会在垄断者之前行动。