SUMMARY

This paper explores the reasons for the suboptimal fiscal–monetary policy mix in the euro area in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and ways in which the status quo can be improved. A comparison of fiscal and monetary policy and of economic outcomes in the euro area, the United States and Japan suggests that both fiscal and monetary policies in the euro area have been overly tight. Fiscal policy has been hampered by the institutional framework which constrains individual states and lacks instruments to secure an appropriate aggregate stance. Monetary policy has been hampered by the distributional effects of balance sheet policies which needed to be adopted at the zero lower bound and by discretionary decisions taken before the crisis such as the reliance on credit rating agencies for determining collateral eligibility for monetary operations. The compromising of the ‘safe asset’ status of euro area sovereign debt during the crisis complicated fiscal and monetary policies. Changes in the discretionary decisions governing the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area can potentially reduce the distributional effects of policy and improve the fiscal–policy mix and longer-term prospects for the euro area.

中文翻译：

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欧元区的财政货币政策组合：下限为零的挑战

概括

本文探讨了全球金融危机后欧元区财政与货币政策组合欠佳的原因，以及改善现状的方法。通过对欧元区的财政和货币政策以及经济成果进行比较，美国和日本表明，欧元区的财政和货币政策都过于紧缩。财政政策受到体制框架的制约，体制框架制约着各个国家，而且缺乏确保适当的总体立场的手段。货币政策受到资产负债表政策的分配效应（必须在零下限范围内采用）以及危机之前采取的酌处决定（例如依赖信用评级机构确定货币业务抵押资格的决定）的阻碍。危机期间欧元区主权债务的“安全资产”地位受损，使财政和货币政策复杂化。决定欧元区货币政策执行的自由裁量决定的改变可能会降低政策的分配效应，并改善欧元区的财政政策组合和长期前景。