The huge fiscal expansions triggered by the corona crisis raised debt/GDP ratios to very high levels. This led some economists to reconsider the taboo on seignorage. Following a brief documentation of the crisis impact and aggregate demand policies responses the paper discusses views of academics and policymakers on seignorage. Optimal taxation considerations imply that the decision on allocating deficit financing between debt and seignorage falls within the realm of fiscal authorities—a fact that infringes on central bank (CB) autonomy. The paper explores ideas aimed at improving the tradeoff between those two principles. Implication of cross-country variations in the need to use seignorage is discussed. Comparison of the indirect contribution of quantitative easing (QE) to deficit financing with the direct contribution of seignorage implies that QE is a substitute to seignorage that preserves central bank dominance without much change in existing monetary institutions. Comparison of empirical evidence from the USA during the global financial crisis with the post-WWI German inflation supports the view that for countries experiencing deflationary pressure seignorage is more potent in moving inflation toward its target than QE. Given the current outlook temporary use of seignorage does not appear to involve a substantial risk of inflation.

新冠危机引发的巨大财政扩张将债务/GDP比率提高到非常高的水平。这导致一些经济学家重新考虑铸币税的禁忌。在简要记录危机影响和总需求政策反应之后，本文讨论了学术界和政策制定者对铸币税的看法。最优税收考虑意味着在债务和铸币税之间分配赤字融资的决定属于财政当局的范围——这一事实侵犯了中央银行 (CB) 的自主权。本文探讨了旨在改善这两个原则之间权衡的想法。讨论了需要使用铸币税的跨国差异的影响。将量化宽松 (QE) 对赤字融资的间接贡献与铸币税的直接贡献进行比较意味着，QE 是铸币税的替代品，它在现有货币机构没有太大变化的情况下保持中央银行的主导地位。将全球金融危机期间美国的经验证据与一战后德国通胀进行比较，支持这样一种观点，即对于面临通缩压力的国家，铸币税比量化宽松更能有效地将通胀推向其目标。鉴于目前的前景，暂时使用铸币税似乎不会带来重大的通胀风险。将全球金融危机期间美国的经验证据与一战后德国通胀进行比较，支持这样一种观点，即对于面临通缩压力的国家，铸币税比量化宽松更能有效地将通胀推向其目标。鉴于目前的前景，暂时使用铸币税似乎不会带来重大的通胀风险。将全球金融危机期间美国的经验证据与一战后德国通胀进行比较，支持这样一种观点，即对于面临通缩压力的国家，铸币税比量化宽松更能有效地将通胀推向其目标。鉴于目前的前景，暂时使用铸币税似乎不会带来重大的通胀风险。