This paper addresses the title question and provides an argument for the conclusion that so-called phenomenal intentionality, in both its relational and non-relational construals, cannot be identified with intentionality meant as the property for a mental state to be about something. A main premise of the argument presented in support of that conclusion is that a necessary requirement for a property to be identified with intentionality is that it satisfy the features taken to be definitory of it, namely: the possible non-existence of the intentional object (the fact that an intentional state may be directed towards something that does not exist) and aspectuality (the fact that what is intended is always intended in some way, under some specific aspect, from a particular perspective). By taking this premise on board, I attempt to show that phenomenal intentionality cannot be identified with intentionality because, appearances notwithstanding, it ultimately satisfies neither of the two above mentioned features.

本文讨论了标题问题，并为得出这样的结论提供了论据：所谓的意向性意向，无论是在关系的还是非关系的解释中，都不能用意向性来识别，意向性是心理状态关于某物的属性。支持该结论的论点的主要前提是，要对具有意图性的财产进行识别的必要条件是，它必须满足被认为是对财产具有定义性的特征，即：意图对象可能不存在（事实上，故意状态可能对一些不存在的）和被引导貌（根据特定的方面，从特定的角度来看，预期的目的始终是某种方式的事实）。通过以此为前提，我试图证明不能用意向性来识别现象性意向性，因为尽管出现了这种现象，但最终还是不能满足上述两个特征。