Abstract

National research evaluation systems that use metrics for the assessment of academic institutions are usually regarded as exemplifying the same neoliberal model of governance that, with minor variations, is implemented worldwide. This essay argues, however, that despite apparent similarities, metrics are used for different aims in different national cases. It compares the use of figures in the UK RAE/REF, a prototypical neoliberal framework, with various schemas of assessment that have been used to evaluate Russian universities in recent decades. It argues that in the RAE/REF, the principal role of statistics is to solve ‘the lazy agent’ problem by creating a prisoner's dilemma for academic institutions, while in the Russian case, statistics serve to solve ‘the corrupt knower’ problem, preventing collusion between the assessor and the assessed. The essay concludes by putting forward some hypotheses on the origins of different approaches to quantification.

摘要

使用度量标准来评估学术机构的国家研究评估系统通常被认为是同一个新自由主义治理模式的例证，这种模式在全球范围内实施，但略有不同。然而，本文认为，尽管有明显的相似之处，但在不同的国家案例中，指标用于不同的目标。它将英国 RAE/REF（一种典型的新自由主义框架）中的数字使用与近几十年来用于评估俄罗斯大学的各种评估模式进行了比较。它认为，在 RAE/REF 中，统计的主要作用是通过为学术机构制造囚徒困境来解决“懒惰的代理人”问题，而在俄罗斯的案例中，统计的作用是解决“腐败的知识分子”问题，防止评估者与被评估者串通。