This paper analyzes firm boundaries in the US hotel industry. Hotel properties of a given brand are often managed either by a chain employee or by a franchisee. We document that brand properties with the lowest and the highest occupancy rates are more likely to be managed at arm’s length by franchisees. Variation in organizational form is consistent with a model in which the incentives embodied in management contracts vary with property-level productivity. We infer that most hotel chains franchise low-productivity relationships to keep property-level fixed costs low and franchise the most productive relationships to create high-powered incentives for franchisees. Franchisees of high-productivity properties face stronger incentives than the managers of both chain-managed properties and low-productivity franchises because the performance incentives in franchise contracts are proportional to hotel revenues and complement the incentives from franchisees’ property control rights. (JEL D23, F12, L23, D22)

中文翻译：

---

内部和内部距离：生产率异质性和组织形式的变化

本文分析了美国酒店业的公司边界。给定品牌的酒店资产通常由连锁员工或特许经营者管理。我们记录到，拥有率最低和最高的品牌财产更有可能由加盟商按公平原则进行管理。组织形式的变化与一种模型一致，在这种模型中，管理合同中包含的激励因财产水平的生产率而异。我们推断出，大多数连锁酒店特许经营低生产率关系以保持物业水平的固定成本较低，而特许经营效率最高的关系则可以为特许经营者建立强大的激励机制。与连锁经营物业和低生产率特许经营者的经理相比，高生产率物业的特许经营者面临的激励更大，因为特许经营合同中的绩效激励与酒店收入成正比，并补充了特许经营者财产控制权的激励。（JEL D23，F12，L23，D22）