This paper constructs a theoretical model to examine the LOLR policy when a central bank can imperfectly screen insolvent from solvent banks. We find that: (1) Central bank screening produces a “positive” stigma associated with central bank borrowing by punishing insolvent banks. (2) With central bank screening, the LOLR policy in fact reduces moral hazard rather than inducing it. (3) If the central bank can better identify solvent and insolvent banks when they apply for central bank loans, it will improve social welfare first by forcing the insolvent banks to efficiently liquidate their assets and second by deterring banks from choosing the risky assets to start with.

本文构建了一个理论模型来研究当中央银行不能完全从溶剂银行中筛选出破产的情况下的LOLR政策。我们发现：（1）中央银行筛选通过惩罚资不抵债的银行而产生与中央银行借款相关的“正面”污名。（2）通过中央银行的筛选，LOLR政策实际上是在减少而不是诱发道德风险。（3）如果中央银行在申请中央银行贷款时能更好地识别有偿付能力的银行和无力偿债的银行，它将首先通过迫使无力偿债的银行有效清算其资产，其次通过阻止银行选择风险资产来改善其社会福利。和。