Second- and third-party altruistic punishments can both improve knowledge sharing, but it is debatable which does so better. We thus concurrently consider the influence of status conflict advantage and disadvantage on knowledge sharing. We also analyze knowledge sharing by introducing an evolutionary game model and conducting simulations, and reveal the following: (1) the appropriate choice for an organization that is increasing its knowledge contribution is third-party punishment; (2) the status conflict advantage and disadvantage play important roles in knowledge sharing. When the status conflict advantage is greater than the disadvantage, the two players eventually share knowledge, and vice versa. Interestingly, when the status conflict advantage is equal to the disadvantage, the player with the stronger sharing inclination has a powerful impact on the player who would rather hoard knowledge, thus ultimately leading him/her to share. (3) Guanxi, knowledge capacity, and synergy revenue have positive effects on knowledge sharing, while the knowledge sharing cost has a negative influence on them. Moreover, the stable equilibrium result is affected by the initial system state. In sum, our results not only promote the understanding of altruistic punishment and status conflict regarding knowledge sharing but also provide practical implications for both organizations and leaders.

中文翻译：

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工作场所的利他惩罚，身份冲突和知识共享：进化博弈模型

第二方和第三方的利他惩罚都可以改善知识共享，但是效果更好则值得商de。因此，我们同时考虑了身份冲突优势和劣势对知识共享的影响。我们还通过引入演化博弈模型并进行模拟来分析知识共享，并揭示以下内容：（1）对于增加其知识贡献的组织，适当的选择是第三方惩罚；（2）地位冲突的优缺点在知识共享中起着重要作用。当地位冲突优势大于劣势优势时，两个参与者最终会共享知识，反之亦然。有趣的是，当地位冲突优势等于劣势时，分享倾向更强的玩家会对宁愿ho积知识的玩家产生强大的影响，从而最终导致他/她分享。（3）关系，知识能力和协同收益对知识共享具有积极影响，而知识共享成本则对知识共享具有消极影响。而且，稳定的平衡结果受初始系统状态的影响。总而言之，我们的研究结果不仅增进了对知识共享的利他惩罚和地位冲突的理解，而且对组织和领导者都具有实际意义。而知识共享成本对他们却有负面影响。而且，稳定的平衡结果受初始系统状态的影响。总而言之，我们的研究结果不仅增进了对知识共享的利他惩罚和地位冲突的理解，而且对组织和领导者都具有实际意义。而知识共享成本对他们却有负面影响。而且，稳定的平衡结果受初始系统状态的影响。总而言之，我们的研究结果不仅增进了对知识共享的利他惩罚和地位冲突的理解，而且对组织和领导者都具有实际意义。