Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever (and could be none). I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine the motivation of those who qualify in some way the general claim that there are synchronic and diachronic criteria of identity for every kind, then present my direct and categorical argument against such criteria. I next evaluate the objections of those who argue that rejecting criteria of identity has untenable results. These objections are ineffective, each based on the incorrect assumption that if there is no criterion of identity for a kind, the identity of an instance of that kind is independent of its qualities. I conclude by considering some of the upshots of rejecting criteria of identity and the insight doing so provides into things in general and the limits of ontological inquiry.

有些人否认具体有一个人的身分标准，而有些人否认有任何历时性的身分标准。但是，我认为，对于任何种类的身份，没有共时性或历时性的标准（也可能没有）。我首先阐述身份标准的概念，以阐明当我坚持没有身份身份时到底被拒绝了什么。我研究了那些以某种方式获得资格的人们的动机，这些人普遍认为每种身份都有共时和历时性的认同标准，然后针对这种标准提出我的直接和绝对的论点。接下来，我对那些认为拒绝认同标准产生不合理结果的人的异议进行评估。这些异议是无效的，每个异议都基于这样一个错误的假设：如果没有某种类型的身份标准，则该类型实例的身份与其质量无关。