We examine the implications of chief executive officer (CEO) succession methods for firm outcomes and executive incentives. Focusing on internal CEO successions, we find that the largest U.S. firms typically rely on two types of succession methods, namely, heir apparent and horse race successions. Although heir apparent and horse race CEO candidates have similar qualifications, the consequences of these two succession methods differ significantly. We find that horse race successions induce conflict and are detrimental to firm performance but not necessarily to the newly appointed CEOs. Our findings suggest succession method influences firm performance, executive incentives and CEO labour markets.

中文翻译：

---

权力的游戏——内部 CEO 继任和结果的动态

我们研究了首席执行官 (CEO) 继任方法对公司成果和高管激励的影响。关注内部 CEO 继任，我们发现美国最大的公司通常依赖两种类型的继任方法，即继承人和赛马继任。继任人与赛马CEO候选人虽然资历相似，但这两种继任方式的后果却大相径庭。我们发现赛马接班会引发冲突，对公司业绩不利，但不一定对新任命的 CEO 不利。我们的研究结果表明，继任方法会影响公司绩效、高管激励和 CEO 劳动力市场。