In many health care systems GPs receive fees for their services. Policymakers may use the size of these fees to try to incentivise GPs to provide more care. However, evidence is mixed on whether and how GPs respond to an increase in the fee size. This study investigates how GPs respond to an average increase of 150% in the fee for a high-effort and infrequent service such as a home visit due to patients’ illness. We consider Danish GPs’ provision of these visits to enlisted patients living outside of nursing homes. Using linear regressions with general practice fixed effects and a rich number of control variables, we estimate the association between GPs’ provision of these home visits and the fee rise. On average, we find no association between the fee rise and GPs’ provision of home visits. However, we find that GPs who previously provided the fewest home visits to eligible patients increase their provision by 13% after the fee rise compared to other GPs. This increase in visits is driven by more patients receiving multiple visits after the fee rise. We conclude that a fee rise may not yield a strong response in GPs’ provision of high-effort and infrequent services such as home visits.

在许多医疗保健系统中，全科医生为其服务收取费用。政策制定者可能会利用这些费用的数额来激励全科医生提供更多的护理。然而，关于 GP 是否以及如何应对费用规模的增加，证据不一。这项研究调查了全科医生如何应对高强度和不频繁的服务（例如因患者疾病而进行的家访）的费用平均增加 150%。我们考虑丹麦全科医生为居住在疗养院外的入伍患者提供这些访问。使用具有一般实践固定效应和大量控制变量的线性回归，我们估计全科医生提供这些家访与费用上涨之间的关联。平均而言，我们发现费用上涨与全科医生提供家访之间没有关联。然而，我们发现，与其他 GP 相比，之前为符合条件的患者提供最少家访的 GP 在费用上涨后增加了 13%。费用上涨后，更多的患者接受了多次就诊，从而推动了就诊次数的增加。我们得出的结论是，费用上涨可能不会对 GP 提供高强度和不频繁的服务（例如家访）产生强烈反应。