ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis of moral cognition supports a form of (moderate) moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of our moral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neither moral expertise, nor moral learning, nor the possibility of moral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form of moral abolitionism, according to which we should make fewer moral judgments much more carefully.

中文翻译：

---

反对道德判断。道德废除主义的经验案例

摘要

在这篇论文中，我认为最近关于道德认知心理基础的证据支持了一种（温和的）道德废止主义。我确定了破坏我们道德判断的认知质量的三个主要问题——污染、可靠性和不良激励——并拒绝了三种可能的回应：道德专业知识、道德学习和道德进步的可能性都不能成功解决上述认知问题。结果是一种温和的道德废除主义，根据这种形式，我们应该更加谨慎地做出更少的道德判断。