This study considers a duopoly model in which both a consumer-friendly (CF) firm and a for-profit (FP) firm undertake cost-reducing R&D investments in an endogenous R&D timing game and then play Cournot output competition. When the CF firm chooses its profit-oriented consumer-friendliness, we show that the consumer-friendliness is non-monotone in spillovers under both simultaneous move and sequential move with FP firm’s leadership while it is decreasing under sequential move with CF firm’s leadership. We also show that a simultaneous-move outcome is a unique equilibrium when the spillovers are low and the CF firm invests higher R&D and obtains higher profits. When the spillovers are not low, two sequential-move outcomes appear and the CF firm might obtain lower profits with higher spillovers under the CF firm leadership.

本研究考虑了双头垄断模型，其中消费者友好型（CF）公司和营利性（FP）公司都在内生的研发时间博弈中进行降低成本的研发投资，然后进行古诺产出竞争。当CF公司选择以利润为导向的消费者友好型时，我们表明，在FP公司领导层同时移动和顺序移动时，消费者友好性在溢出中不是单调的，而在CF公司领导层的连续移动和顺行移动中，消费者友好性却在下降。我们还表明，当溢出率较低且CF公司投资更高的R＆D并获得更高的利润时，同时移动的结果是唯一的均衡。当溢出量不低时，会出现两个连续移动的结果，并且CF公司在CF公司领导下可能会获得较高的溢出量而获得较低的利润。