We present a critical description and analysis of the conceptual framework and political processes by which regulators set electricity distribution prices in Australia. Prices have increased greatly after the market restructure in the 1990s, contrary to the rationale behind that reform. Our paper is both interpretive and analytical. We find that the regulators’ methodology, which combines accounting asset valuation and financial theory, not only invites “gaming” by the networks (and higher electricity prices) but, more remarkably, is technically misconceived on its own theoretical terms. We interpret the regulatory framework as innately one-sided and preordained to favour electricity network owners. Electricity market ‘reforms’ have brought not only higher prices but also social hardship and disruption. It is important that their foundations be questioned, not only from alternative political and sociological perspectives but also in terms of the financial logic on which they supposedly stand. Ostensibly independent and sophisticated submissions to regulators have been contrived by vested political and economic interests to sway regulators’ decisions. By tilting the regulatory regime, the electricity networks have harmed not only household consumers but also business and industrial electricity users, which of itself raises questions of whether there are actually economic benefits. Our questioning of the internal validity of the utilities regulators’ rational economics methodology is a provocative and potentially effective form of criticism because it cannot be waved away as ideological, political or ‘unscientific’.

我们对澳大利亚监管机构设定配电价格的概念框架和政治过程进行了批判性描述和分析。1990 年代市场重组后价格大幅上涨，这与改革背后的基本原理相反。我们的论文既是解释性的又是分析性的。我们发现，监管机构的方法结合了会计资产估值和金融理论，不仅会招致网络“博弈”（以及更高的电价），而且更值得注意的是，在技术上对其本身的理论术语存在误解。我们将监管框架解释为天生片面的，并且注定有利于电网所有者。电力市场“改革”不仅带来了更高的价格，也带来了社会困难和混乱。重要的是，他们的基础受到质疑，不仅要从不同的政治和社会学角度，而且还要从他们所谓的金融逻辑的角度来看。既得政治和经济利益人为向监管机构提交表面上独立和复杂的意见，以影响监管机构的决定。通过倾斜监管制度，电力网络不仅伤害了家庭消费者，也伤害了商业和工业用电用户，这本身就引发了是否真的有经济利益的问题。我们对公用事业监管机构理性经济学方法的内部有效性的质疑是一种具有挑衅性且潜在有效的批评形式，因为它不能被视为意识形态、政治或“不科学”而挥之不去。不仅从不同的政治和社会学角度来看，而且从他们所谓的金融逻辑的角度来看。既得政治和经济利益人为向监管机构提交表面上独立和复杂的意见，以影响监管机构的决定。通过倾斜监管制度，电力网络不仅伤害了家庭消费者，也伤害了商业和工业用电用户，这本身就引发了是否真的有经济利益的问题。我们对公用事业监管机构理性经济学方法的内部有效性的质疑是一种具有挑衅性且潜在有效的批评形式，因为它不能被视为意识形态、政治或“不科学”而挥之不去。不仅从不同的政治和社会学角度来看，而且从他们所谓的金融逻辑的角度来看。既得政治和经济利益人为向监管机构提交表面上独立和复杂的意见，以影响监管机构的决定。通过倾斜监管制度，电力网络不仅伤害了家庭消费者，也伤害了商业和工业用电用户，这本身就引发了是否真的有经济利益的问题。我们对公用事业监管机构理性经济学方法的内部有效性的质疑是一种具有挑衅性且潜在有效的批评形式，因为它不能被视为意识形态、政治或“不科学”而挥之不去。