Abstract

The aim of this article is to determine whether there is opportunistic behavior in local government decisions related to contracting out, public-private partnership (PPP) and/or public externalization. Analysis of the results obtained from applying a fixed effects panel data model to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities supports the existence of asymmetric opportunistic behavior. Specifically, there is strong evidence that in preelection years, there is less likelihood of contracting out and PPP decisions being approved, and a greater probability of public externalization taking place. In post-election years, an increase in capital spending is associated with a lower probability of contracting out and of PPP. An increase in current spending in preelection years reduces the probability of decisions being taken on contracting out and PPP. These empirical results highlight the extent of opportunistic behavior in selecting management forms for the delivery of local government services.

摘要

本文的目的是确定地方政府在与外包、公私合作伙伴关系 (PPP) 和/或公共外部化相关的决策中是否存在机会主义行为。将固定效应面板数据模型应用于 2,274 个西班牙城市的样本所获得的结果分析支持不对称机会主义行为的存在。具体而言，有强有力的证据表明，在选举前几年，外包和 PPP 决定获得批准的可能性较小，而发生公共外部化的可能性更大。在选举后的几年中，资本支出的增加与外包和 PPP 的可能性降低有关。选举前年度当前支出的增加降低了就外包和 PPP 做出决定的可能性。