We show that for the United States and Australia consumers expect significantly lower inflation when the political party they support holds executive office. This finding cannot be explained by previously documented sources of heterogeneity in consumer inflation expectations. It is consistent with stereotypical thinking (Bordalo et al. 2016), pointing to the use of heuristics in the formation of macro‐economic beliefs. Our findings have implications for consumers' understanding of central bank independence and its connection with inflation stabilization.

中文翻译：

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政治态度和通货膨胀预期：证据和启示

我们表明，对于美国和澳大利亚的消费者来说，当他们支持的政党执政时，他们预计通货膨胀率将大大降低。先前记录的消费者通胀预期异质性来源无法解释这一发现。这与刻板印象一致（Bordalo等，2016），指出在宏观经济信念形成过程中使用启发式方法。我们的发现对消费者对中央银行独立性及其与通货膨胀稳定的联系的理解具有启示意义。