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Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences ( IF 2.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-09 , DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09738-x
James Deery

For some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.



中文翻译:

扩展扩展意识辩论:感知,想象力和常见假设

对于某些人而言,实现现象意识的状态和过程并不局限于经历对象的有机体界限之内。取而代之的是,知觉体验的亚个人基础可以而且确实超出了大脑和身体,从而通过人与世界的互动来暗示环境因素。预测处理的支持者满足了这些要求,他们建议将感知和想象力理解为相同内部机制的产物。在这种观点下,由于视觉想象不被认为是涉及世界的,因此可以假设,涉及世界不一定是感知必不可少的,因此关于次人格基础的内在主义是正确的。然而,从知觉和想象力的统一出发,对内在主义的论证依靠其对两种经验状态之间关系的可疑概念的力量。我认为,预测方法的支持者对隐含的对共同种类假设的隐含承诺是有罪的,这种假设并非从其框架中得出的。也就是说,假设知觉和想象力属于同一类基本的心理事件。我将争辩说,有几种可能的构想这种关系的方式,而没有从他们的心理学理论中得出内在的形而上学结论。因此,内部主义者欠缺关于这种关系的辩论澄清,并应有进一步的论据来确保自己的立场。我认为,预测方法的支持者对隐含的对共同种类假设的隐含承诺是有罪的,这种假设并非从其框架中得出的。也就是说,假设知觉和想象力属于同一类基本的心理事件。我将争辩说,有几种可能的构想这种关系的方式,而没有从他们的心理学理论中得出内在的形而上学结论。因此,内部主义者欠缺关于这种关系的辩论澄清,并应有进一步的论据来确保自己的立场。我认为,预测方法的支持者对隐含的对共同种类假设的隐含承诺是有罪的,这种假设并非从其框架中得出的。也就是说,假设知觉和想象力属于同一类基本的心理事件。我将争辩说,有几种可能的构想这种关系的方式,而没有从他们的心理学理论中得出内在的形而上学结论。因此,内部主义者欠缺关于这种关系的辩论澄清,并应有进一步的论据来确保自己的立场。假设感知和想象力是同一类基本的心理事件。我将争辩说,有几种可能的构想这种关系的方式,而没有从他们的心理学理论中得出内在的形而上学结论。因此,内部主义者欠缺关于这种关系的辩论澄清,并应有进一步的论据来确保自己的立场。假设感知和想象力是同一类基本的心理事件。我将争辩说,有几种可能的构想这种关系的方式,而没有从他们的心理学理论中得出内在的形而上学结论。因此,内部主义者欠缺关于这种关系的辩论澄清,并应有进一步的论据来确保自己的立场。

更新日期:2021-04-09
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