We study the role of private information in the equity lending market in a rational expectations model with endogenous loan fees. When all investors are privately informed, an increase in information precision reduces the fee by increasing trade aggressiveness and decreasing demand dispersion. However, when some investors are uninformed, the information asymmetry tends to increase the fee, and, thus, the overall effect of an increase in precision is ambiguous. We show that the fee can be incrementally informative given the stock price and that fee opaqueness tends to increase the fee but has an ambiguous effect on the stock price.

中文翻译：

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私人信息、证券借贷和资产价格

我们在具有内生贷款费用的理性预期模型中研究了私人信息在股权借贷市场中的作用。当所有投资者都获得私人信息时，信息准确性的提高会通过增加交易积极性和减少需求分散来降低费用。然而，当一些投资者不知情时，信息不对称往往会增加费用，因此，提高精确度的整体效果是模糊的。我们表明，考虑到股票价格，费用可以增加信息量，并且费用不透明往往会增加费用，但对股票价格的影响不明确。