We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.

中文翻译：

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激进主义和收购

我们从能够努力提高公司价值的大股东的角度比较激进主义和收购。我们表明分散股东的搭便车行为具有以下含义：首先，激进主义比敌意收购更有利可图，即使效率较低。其次，激进主义在促成而非替代收购时最有效。第三，这种收购行动获得了丰厚的回报。更广泛地说，我们的理论暗示活动家专注于治理改革，有限的临时所有权是活动的优势而不是缺点。