Persistent performance in venture capital is routinely interpreted as evidence for skill. We present a dynamic model of delegated investment with endogenous fund heterogeneity and deal flow, which generates performance persistence without skill differences and predicts mean reversion in long-term performance. Investors working with multiple funds use contingent payments and tiered contracts to induce proper project nurturing and managerial effort. Successful funds receive continuation contracts that tolerate investment failure and encourage innovation, and subsequently finance entrepreneurs through a path-dependent assortative matching favoring incumbents. Recent empirical findings corroborate the models general implications, and the economic mechanisms are robust to short-term contracting, endogenous bargaining, and double moral hazard issues.

中文翻译：

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持久的运气：理论及其在风险投资中的应用

在风险投资中的持续表现通常被解释为技能的证据。我们提出了一种具有内生资金异质性和交易流的委托投资的动态模型，该模型可产生无技能差异的绩效持久性，并预测长期绩效的均值回归。与多个基金合作的投资者使用或有付款和分层合同来进行适当的项目培育和管理工作。成功的基金会获得延续合同，这些合同可以容忍投资失败并鼓励创新，随后通过路径依赖的分类匹配为企业家提供资金，这有利于老牌公司。最近的经验发现证实了该模型的一般含义，并且经济机制对于短期合同，内生讨价还价和双重道德风险问题具有鲁棒性。