We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.

中文翻译：

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行动主义与接管

我们从能够提供努力以提高公司价值的大股东的角度比较行动主义和接管行为。我们表明，分散的股东的搭便车行为具有以下含义：首先，即使是效率较低的行动主义也比敌意收购更有利可图。第二，行动主义是经纪而不是替代收购的最有效的方式。第三，这种收购激进主义获得了丰厚的回报。从更广泛的意义上说，我们的理论意味着，活动家专门从事治理改革，而有限的临时所有权是行动主义的优势而不是缺点。