Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems.

可感知的颜色与有色物体的物理属性之间的双重分离导致许多哲学家认可关系主义者对颜色的解释。我认为，信念的态度（人们在日常生活中相互归属的信念）与内在的认知状态之间存在类似的双重分离。信念（一些认知科学家将其视为嵌齿在认知系统中的信念）存在于心理解释的各个层面。这些分离提供了避免将信念态度与信念的内在认知状态相混淆的充分理由。我建议解释主义对前者有一个吸引人的解释（因为它们没有与后者混为一谈）。就像颜色一样，信念的态度演变成生态的象征，而不是认知系统中的齿轮。