ABSTRACT

In this long excerpt, Bibler argues that, in Hegel’s logic, thinking devours the object—the Absolute is achieved—and therefore thinking itself disappears. Yet thinking necessarily involves being, even though it is expressed in a different logic. At this point, the inquiry shifts to the question about the interaction of various logics. Contrary to this, Bibler claims that no meta-logic is required when it comes to justifying the beginning of each logic. This issue was not explicated in Hegel; therefore, his logic has an end. Similarly, Hegel had no rationale for the beginning point of logic, because pure being and nothing do not contain contradictions. Feuerbach tried to introduce dialogue, but his dialogue is that of the thinker with himself, not a dialogue between “I” and “You”; therefore, it does not include the Other and, thus, is not a true dialogue. Rejecting this Duplicate, Feuerbach did not understand the role of the Interlocutor, and so his logic is also mono-logical. The difficulty lies in the attempt to introduce being into logic, and this is possible only if logic is formulated in a different way. Thus, Bibler proposes a different logic, a logic of being, which he interprets as the logic of non-knowledge, the logic of non-understanding. What escapes understanding is no other type of reasoning. For example, medieval reasoning based on religion and its explanations. In it, the world is understood not as object but as inherent in God. In modern-era European thought, when one thinks, one just as necessarily includes both what one understands and what one does not understand in one’s knowledge of the object, as Kant wrote: “The unconditional is located in things, because we do not know them.” In this regard, Bibler praises the logic of Nicholas of Cusa, who includes scientific ignorance in his explanations. The value of Descartes’ and Spinoza’s logics are also briefly examined here, along with the transition to justifying a new logic.

摘要

在这段漫长的摘录中，圣经学家认为，按照黑格尔的逻辑，思想吞噬了客体，即“绝对”实现了，因此思想本身就消失了。尽管思考是用不同的逻辑表达的，但思考必然涉及到存在。在这一点上，研究转向关于各种逻辑相互作用的问题。与此相反，圣经学家声称，在论证每种逻辑的开始时，不需要元逻辑。黑格尔没有阐明这个问题。因此，他的逻辑就结束了。同样，黑格尔也没有逻辑起点的理由，因为纯净的存在和任何事物都不包含矛盾。费尔巴哈试图引入对话，但他的对话只是思想家与他自己的对话，而不是“我”与“你”之间的对话。因此，它不包括其他，因此，不是真正的对话。拒绝这种重复，Feuerbach不了解对话者的角色，因此他的逻辑也是单逻辑的。困难在于尝试将逻辑引入逻辑中，而这只有在逻辑以另一种方式表达时才有可能。因此，圣经者提出了一种不同的逻辑，即存在逻辑，他将其解释为非知识逻辑，非理解逻辑。没有理解的是没有其他类型的推理。例如，基于宗教及其解释的中世纪推理。在其中，世界不是被理解为对象，而是被理解为上帝固有的。在现代的欧洲思想中，当人们思考时，正如康德所写的那样，一个人必然既包括一个人理解的知识，也包括一个人不了解的知识，正如康德所写的：“无条件的存在于事物之中，因为我们不认识他们。” 在这方面，圣经学家称赞库萨尼古拉斯的逻辑，他的解释中包括科学上的无知。笛卡尔逻辑和斯宾诺莎逻辑的价值也在这里进行了简要的研究，以及向新逻辑的证明过渡。