A 2006 rule change in the United States mandated that publicly traded firms provide more detailed disclosures about executives’ compensation plans. In response to the new disclosure requirements, Cournot firms with large market shares add revenue-based pay to their CEOs’ pay packages. This change in pay practices coincides with a shift towards more aggressive product market equilibria, characterized by greater production expenditures and lower margins. Jointly, these patterns are consistent with predictions from the theory of “strategic delegation,” and suggest that the new disclosure requirements enhanced the viability of committing through executive incentives. After adopting the new disclosure requirements, many firms appear to restructure their executives’ pay packages as strategic devices designed to make rivals curtail their competitive actions.

美国 2006 年的一项规则变更要求上市公司提供有关高管薪酬计划的更详细信息。为响应新的披露要求，拥有大量市场份额的古诺公司在其 CEO 的薪酬方案中增加了基于收入的薪酬。薪酬实践的这种变化恰逢转向更激进的产品市场均衡，其特点是生产支出增加和利润率降低。总的来说，这些模式与“战略授权”理论的预测一致，并表明新的披露要求通过高管激励增强了承诺的可行性。在采纳新的披露要求后，