We propose an extension of the incomplete markets general equilibrium model with production to situations in which firms can default (bankruptcy). In the model, firms are owned by a single individual whose roles as entrepreneur and consumer are anonymous. Assets are exogenously collateralised and are seized together with future output in case of default. Default is thus endogenous as output determines the deliveries from the assets issued. In turn, the receipts from each asset purchased are assumed to depend on a fraction of the firm’s output. This fraction is anonymous and is treated as given by individuals who will anticipate it, in equilibrium, as a proportion of aggregate output, generating counter-cyclical default. We show that, in this context, the financial policies of the firm are, in general, not irrelevant. We establish the existence of equilibria and discuss the nature of the inefficiencies introduced by the presence of bankruptcy.

我们提议将带有生产的不完全市场一般均衡模型扩展到企业可能违约（破产）的情况。在该模型中，公司由一个个体拥有，该个体作为企业家和消费者的角色是匿名的。在发生违约的情况下，资产是外来抵押，并与未来产出一起被扣押。因此，违约是内生的，因为产出决定了所发行资产的交付量。反过来，假设从购买的每种资产中获得的收益取决于公司产出的一小部分。这部分是匿名的，并被视为个人给出的部分，他们会在均衡状态下预期它占总产出的一部分，从而产生反周期违约。我们证明，在这种情况下，企业的财务政策通常并不是无关紧要的。