This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two-sided markets in which both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two-sided platform market with a monopolistic multiproduct firm (content provider) on one side and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by the increase in multihoming consumers and the negative effect caused by the restriction of distribution channels.

中文翻译：

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双边市场的独家内容

本研究调查了独家内容提供在双方都被允许加入多个平台的双边市场中的作用。我们考虑一个双头垄断的双边平台市场模型，一方面是垄断的多产品公司（内容提供商），另一方面是消费者。该模型表明，垄断内容提供商将排他性作为战略承诺来平衡对其议价能力的两个相反的影响：多宿主消费者增加引起的积极影响和分销渠道限制引起的消极影响。