According to epistemic utility theory, epistemic rationality is teleological: epistemic norms are instrumental norms that have the aim of acquiring accuracy. What’s definitive of these norms is that they can be expected to lead to the acquisition of accuracy when followed. While there’s much to be said in favor of this approach, it turns out that it faces a couple of worrisome extensional problems involving the future. The first problem involves credences about the future, and the second problem involves future credences. Examining prominent solutions to a different extensional problem for this approach reinforces the severity of the two problems involving the future. Reflecting on these problems reveals the source: the teleological assumption that epistemic rationality aims at acquiring accuracy.

根据认知效用理论，认知合理性是目的论的：认知规范是工具性规范，旨在获得准确性。这些规范的权威之处在于，遵循这些规范可以期望获得准确性。尽管有很多方法可以支持这种方法，但事实证明，它面临着涉及未来的一系列令人担忧的扩展性问题。第一个问题涉及对未来的信任，第二个问题涉及对未来的信任。检查针对此方法的不同扩展问题的突出解决方案，会加剧涉及未来的两个问题的严重性。对这些问题的反思揭示了其根源：认识论理性旨在获得准确性的目的论假设。