While there is no shortage of philosophical literature discussing knowledge by acquaintance, there is a surprising dearth of work about theories of epistemic justification based on direct acquaintance. This paper explores a basic framework for a thoroughly general account of epistemic justification by acquaintance. I argue that this approach to epistemic justification satisfies two importance aspects (objective and subjective) of justification. After sketching how the acquaintance approach can meet both objective and subjective aspects for epistemic justification, I will outline how this general account of justification by acquaintance can be applied to the analysis of justification for many types of beliefs (e.g., non-inferential, inferential, a priori, empirical justification, etc.). Finally, some of the objections to the acquaintance approach will be considered and answered.

虽然不乏通过认识来讨论知识的哲学文献，但基于直接认识的认识论证理的工作却令人惊讶地缺乏。本文探讨了一个全面的认识论认识论证理的基本框架。我认为，这种认识论证明的方法满足了证明的两个重要方面（客观和主观）。在勾勒熟识方法如何满足认识论辩护的客观和主观方面之后，我将概述如何将这种熟识论证的一般说明应用于许多类型的信念的辩证分析（例如，非推论，推论，先验，经验证明等）。最后，