We run experiments on second price auctions with resale opportunities, where a zero-value bidder, called a speculator, is commonly known to exist. Garratt and Tröger (2006) show that there is a continuum of speculative equilibria, apart from the standard bid-your-value one, in which the speculator gets the good in the first stage auction with a positive probability. She pays a price of zero and resells it to the private-value bidder in the second stage. In the most extreme equilibrium, the private-value bidder always bids zero and the speculator obtains the good. We find that bidders frequently play strategies that are consistent with a speculative equilibrium. When the speculative equilibrium is not observed, the presence of the speculator leads to more aggressive bidding by private-value bidders that results in increased revenue for the seller. An increase in the number of private-value bidders makes speculation harder, but does not eliminate it.

我们在具有转售机会的第二次价格拍卖中进行了实验，其中众所周知存在一个零价竞标者，即所谓的投机者。Garratt和Tröger（2006）指出，除了标准的买价/卖价外，投机均衡具有连续性，投机者在第一阶段拍卖中以正概率获得商品。她支付零价格，然后在第二阶段将其转售给私有价值竞标者。在最极端的均衡中，私人价值竞标者总是竞标为零，而投机者获得了商品。我们发现，投标人经常采用与投机均衡相一致的策略。当没有观察到投机均衡时，投机者的存在会导致私人价值竞标者进行更积极的竞标，从而增加卖方的收入。