According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Proponents of grounding contingentism argue against this claim, stating that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. In this article I discuss a recent argument from restricted accidental generalisations provided by contingentists that advances such possibility. I argue that grounding necessitarianism can be defended against it. To achieve this aim, I postulate a relationship between grounding and essence by introducing a notion of individual essences understood as a set of essential properties that individuate its bearer. According to a proposed view grounding holds in virtue of identities of its relata, which are in turn determined by their respective individual essences. From there I claim that if grounding holds in virtue of the individual essences of its relata, then it is possible to resist the objection from restricted accidental generalisations and maintain a view that grounds necessitates what is grounded.

根据扎根的必然主义，如果某些事实扎根另一个事实，那么前者的获得就必然要后者。支持偶然性的支持者反对这一主张，指出前者的事实有可能在不需要后者的情况下获得。在本文中，我讨论了由特遣队提供的有限的偶然性概括引起的最新论点，这种观点提出了这种可能性。我认为可以捍卫扎根的必要主义。为了实现此目标，我通过引入个体本质的概念来推测基础与本质之间的关系，这些概念被理解为将其承载者个性化的一组基本属性。根据一种提出的观点，接地是通过其关系的身份来确定的，而关系的身份又是由它们各自的本质决定的。