It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.

有人认为，现代的认识论可以在卡尔纳普的解释方法下统一，该方法起源于邻近的科学哲学领域。但是，目前尚不清楚强调知识的解释性作用的认识论理论在多大程度上适合该图景，科恩伯利斯的自然类型认识论和威廉姆森的知识优先论方法就是恰当的例子。在这方面，我提出三个问题。我们能否在更标准，更少特质的解释论框架下获得对这些方法的见解而又不损失？我们可以这样做而不会被反对这些方法的著名批评所困扰吗？最后，这些方法在解释论者的渲染下是否连贯一致？我认为，就科恩布利斯而言，这三个问题的答案基本上都是肯定的。许多知识优先的方法也可以转化为解释论。但是，从这个角度来看，威廉姆森关于将知识视为无法定义的中心论点，是指解决盖蒂尔问题的持续但未成功的尝试，等于对该问题反应过度。除了倒数主义，我在倒数第二节中问威廉姆森自己的哲学方法到底意味着什么。提到解决Gettier问题的持久但未成功的尝试，就等于对该问题反应过度。除了倒数主义，我在倒数第二节中问威廉姆森自己的哲学方法到底意味着什么。提到解决Gettier问题的持久但未成功的尝试，就等于对该问题反应过度。除了倒数主义，我在倒数第二节中问威廉姆森自己的哲学方法到底意味着什么。