ABSTRACT

Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put 13 provinces under emergency rule (1987–2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using the first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro-insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) the legal-institutional framework of counterinsurgency affects civilians’ political perceptions in fundamental ways, and (2) it can lead to failure when its repressive arm target activism. Overall, the paper presents an institutionalist account of civilian perceptions during wartime.

摘要

应急区是否有效的平叛措施？为应对库尔德人的叛乱，土耳其政府将 13 个省置于紧急统治之下（1987-2002 年）。在本文中，我们调查了紧急统治与支持叛乱政党的选举支持之间的联系。首先，使用一阶差分方法，我们表明紧急统治下省份的任期有助于支持叛乱党的投票份额。其次，我们调查哪些反叛乱政策作为一种机制将紧急规则与支持叛乱的投票联系起来。我们发现针对活动家的拘留将选举偏好转向支持叛乱的政党，而人口流离失所和政党认同紧急统治导致了相反的结果。这些结果表明：（1）反叛乱的法律制度框架从根本上影响了平民的政治观念，（2）当其镇压性武器瞄准激进主义时，它可能导致失败。总体而言，本文对战时平民的看法进行了制度主义的描述。