We use traditional and nontraditional data to measure the collapse and partial recovery of the US labor market from March to early July, contrast this downturn to previous recessions, and provide preliminary evidence on the effects of the policy response. For hourly workers at both small and large businesses, nearly all of the decline in employment occurred between March 14 and 28. It was driven by low-wage services, particularly the retail and leisure and hospitality sectors. A large share of the job losses in small businesses reflected firms that closed entirely, though many subsequently reopened. Firms that were already unhealthy were more likely to close and less likely to reopen, and disadvantaged workers were more likely to be laid off and less likely to return. Most laid-off workers expected to be recalled, and this was predictive of rehiring. Shelter-in-place orders drove only a small share of job losses. Last, states that received more small business loans from the Paycheck Protection Program and states with more generous unemployment insurance benefits had milder declines and faster recoveries. We find no evidence that high unemployment insurance replacement rates drove job losses or slowed rehiring.

我们使用传统和非传统数据来衡量3月至7月初美国劳动力市场的崩溃和部分复苏，将这次衰退与之前的衰退进行对比，并提供有关政策应对效果的初步证据。对于小型企业和大型企业的小时工而言，几乎所有的就业下降都发生在3月14日至28日之间。这是由低薪服务，尤其是零售，休闲和酒店业所致。在小型企业中，很大一部分工作损失反映了完全关闭的公司，尽管许多公司随后重新营业。已经不健康的公司更有可能关闭，而重新开业的可能性较小，处境不利的工人更有可能被解雇，而返回的可能性也较小。预计大多数下岗工人将被召回，这是重新聘用的预兆。临时庇护所订单仅造成一小部分失业。最后，从“薪水保护计划”获得更多小企业贷款的州，以及失业保险金更为慷慨的州，下降幅度较小，恢复速度较快。我们发现没有证据表明高失业保险替代率导致失业或放慢就业。