We document stark asynchronicity across U.S. states, particularly across groups of states whose populations have voted consistently Democrat or consistently Republican in national elections; and we show that the risk-sharing channels of these groups of states differ substantially. However, we find that these groups of states–even swing states, where the role of fiscal flows is small (on par with Europe’s)–do share risk. Indeed, we halve previous estimates of states’ residual risk by using new data to account for sharing risk through changes in population, prices, and durable goods consumption. These findings indicate that political differences alone do not themselves preclude macroeconomic risk sharing within a monetary union.

我们记录了美国各州之间的明显异步性，特别是在人口在全国选举中一贯投票给民主党或一贯共和党的州之间；尤其是在各州之间。我们发现这些国家集团的风险分担渠道大不相同。但是，我们发现，这些国家集团（甚至是摇摆州，在这些国家中，财政流动的作用很小（与欧洲的水平相当））也确实承担着风险。实际上，我们通过使用新数据通过人口，价格和耐用品消费的变化来分担风险来将各州的剩余风险以前的估计减半。这些发现表明，政治差异本身并不能排除货币联盟内部的宏观经济风险分担。