This paper investigates the short-run impact of the carbon tax imposition on the equilibrium of the wholesale oligopoly electricity market and the level of carbon emission. In this regard, a game-theoretic framework is devised to analyze the oligopolistic competition of the transmission-constrained generating units under a carbon tax. The independent system operator (ISO) utilizes a double-sided auction design to settle power transactions. The government imposes a carbon tax on power suppliers. The strategic bidding behavior of a generating unit is formulated as a bi-level programming (BLP) problem and then it is transformed into a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The non-cooperative game theory is employed to determine the equilibrium of generating units’ strategic interaction.

The IEEE 9-bus test system is used to examine the economic–environmental effects of a carbon tax in an imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity market. Simulation results show that levy a carbon tax on the generation side results in higher equilibrium price and lower consumption that negatively affects social welfare. Accordingly, carbon taxes effectively abate system-wide carbon dioxide emissions. Though, the physical system (transmission congestion along with heterogeneity in generation technologies) may affect the competitive position of generating units and increases carbon emissions in some areas.

本文研究了征收碳税对批发寡头电力市场均衡和碳排放水平的短期影响。在这方面，设计了一种博弈论框架来分析碳税下输电受限发电机组的寡头竞争。独立系统运营商（ISO）使用双面拍卖设计来结算电力交易。政府对电力供应商征收碳税。将发电机组的战略投标行为表述为双层规划（BLP）问题，然后将其转换为具有均衡约束（MPEC）的数学问题。非合作博弈理论被用来确定发电机组战略互动的平衡。

IEEE 9总线测试系统用于检验竞争不完全的批发电力市场中碳税的经济环境影响。模拟结果表明，对发电侧征收碳税会导致较高的均衡价格和较低的消费量，从而对社会福利产生负面影响。因此，碳税有效地减少了全系统的二氧化碳排放量。但是，物理系统（发电技术中的传输拥挤以及异质性）可能会影响发电机组的竞争地位并增加某些地区的碳排放量。