This paper studies the consignment auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits among polluting firms. By assuming firms have non-increasing marginal values for the permits and linear bid functions, we characterize the linear equilibrium in a divisible consignment auction with positive trading volumes and a unique equilibrium price. We further compare the consignment auction with its uniform-price counterpart. We show that as firms acquire revenues from selling their consigned permits, they have incentives to overstate demands, which results in a higher equilibrium price in a consignment auction than in a uniform-price auction; nevertheless, the ex post efficiency ranking of these two auctions are generally ambiguous. Our results suggest that the non-trade equilibrium of Khezr and MacKenzie (2018) only appears when firms have a constant marginal value.

本文研究了代销拍卖作为污染企业间排放许可的分配机制。通过假设企业的许可证和线性出价函数的边际价值没有增加，我们在具有正交易量和唯一均衡价格的可分割寄售拍卖中描述了线性均衡。我们将寄售拍卖与其统一价格拍卖进一步进行比较。我们发现，随着企业通过出售寄售许可证获得收入，他们有动机高估需求，这导致寄售拍卖中的均衡价格高于统一价格拍卖。但是，这两个拍卖的事后效率排名通常是模棱两可的。